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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In November 1988, an Assessment Team was formed to assist NASA Lan-
gley Research Center (NASA Langley) in assessing the quality, coverage, and
distribution of effort of the flight-critical systems research program at NASA
Langley. This program spans several branches in the Information Systems
Division at NASA Langley, with the bulk of the research being conducted
by the System Validation Methods Branch. The Assessment Team had two
primary sources of information on the research program: (1) review of the
NASA Langley flight-critical systems research program by attending a one-
day briefing at NASA Langley and reviewing representative research publica-
tions and (2) participation at the Flight-Critical Digital Systems Technology
Workshop held at NASA Langley on December 13-15, 1988. Immediately
after the workshop, the Assessment Team held a meeting to determine the
key recommendations set forth in this report.
Within the scope of the review, the Assessment Team has found the
research program to be very sound. All tasks under the current research
program are at least partially addressing the industry needs. However, the
workshop generated many more critical research needs than the Information
Systems Division has resources. The Assessment Team recommends that the
program resources be substantially expanded to give adequate coverage to
the existing research and extended to the additional industry needs iden-
tified. Specifically, the Assessment Team's consensus is that the following
three recommendations be emphasized in any ensuing action. First, the cur-
rent program should be extended to include research and development in
operations and maintenance. Second, the five highest priority research needs
should receive additional funding. These needs are:
1. the development of a validated hierarchical integrated tool set that can
be used to address issues related to life-cycle validation
2. the conduct of cost-tradeoff and effectiveness studies of design method-
ologies and fault tolerance concepts
3. the development and verification of easy-to-use modeling tools that
address reliability, performance, coverage, and cost
4. the conduct of threat modeling, and propagation analysis and testing.
In particular, develop design verification criteria for Electromagnetic
Environment(EME)andHigh Energy Radio Frequency (HERF) related
threats.
5. the compilation and analysis of in-service data
Third, the research program should be focused by selecting an actual
hardware and software system that is under development as a vehicle for the
on-going evaluation of emerging technology.
These recommendations are made in conjunction with the suggestion that
an overall strategy be followed. This strategy involves NASA, the aerospace
industry, and the FAA cooperating in the development of an integrated
methodology for design, verification, and validation of flight-critical systems
that are key to U.S. leadership in the next century. The automotive and
electronics industries in the U.S. have lost their competitiveness to stronger
foreign corporations. Industry data is beginning to suggest a similar threat
to the U.S. aerospace industry, especially aviation. Through NASA, the
aerospace industry, and FAA cooperating, there is an opportunity to address
this threat before it is too late. A relevant precedence for this suggestion is in
the information processing industry. Organizations like the Micro-electronics
Computing Consortium (MCC) and the Software Productivity Consortium
have been formed by cooperating agencies in order to develop a competitive
edge.
1 Introduction and Overview
1.1 The Assessment Team
The Assessment Team evaluated the quality, coverage, and distribution of
effort of the flight-critical digital systems research program in the Informa-
tion Systems Division at NASA Langley Research Center. The team was
composed of:
• Dr. Daniel P. Siewiorek, Chairman
Carnegie-Mellon University
• Mr. Cary R. Spitzer, NASA Representative
NASA Langley Research Center
• Ms. Janet R. Dunham, Coordinator
Research Triangle Institute
• Mr. Greg Chisholm
Argonne National Laboratory
• Dr. Eliezer G. Gai
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.
• Mr. John E. Reed
Mr. Peter J. Saraceni
FAA Technical Center
• Mr. Herman Schmid
General Electric Company
• Dr. Anthony S. Wojcik
Michigan State University
1.2 Assessment Team Activities
1.2.1 Research Briefing
The Assessment Team members attended a one-day briefing on the flight-
critical digital systems research program at NASA Langley. Appendix A
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providesthe agendafor this briefing. This briefinginformed the Assessment
Teamon flight-critical digital systemsresearchactivities at NASALangleyin
aformat that allowedinteractionwith theresearchers.TheAssessmentTeam
was also provided with extensivepublications resulting from the research
program.
1.2.2 Workshop Participation
Subsequent to the research briefing, the Assessment Team participated in
the Flight-Critical Digital Systems Technology Workshop held on December
13 - 15, 1988, at NASA Langley (hereafter referred to as the Workshop). 1
Four industry and one government speakers provided a perspective on the
state-of-the-art in aerospace flight-critical systems. This perspective included
discussion of industry trends as well as future requirements.
After these opening presentations, the workshop broke into seven working
groups to assess the future needs of the industry. Each of the seven working
group sessions was attended by members of the Assessment Team as shown in
Table 1. Assessment Team members were assigned to these working groups
according to their individual research experience and expertise. It was felt
that knowledgeable observers would be in a better position to interpret and
place into context the dynamic ebb and flow of discussions that are the
essence of these dynamic group situations.
Subsection 2.2 of this report summarizes the working group needs as per-
ceived by the Assessment Team members who attended the working group
sessions. In addition to a summary of the working groups conclusions, the
summaries may contain further comments representing the individual opin-
ions of the Assessment Team members. This additional information is pro-
vided as further guidance to the assessment process.
1.2.3 Assessment Team Meeting
Immediately after the workshop an Assessment Team meeting was held to
compare industry needs to the NASA Langley research program. During
this meeting a consensus on industry needs gleaned during the workshop
1A separate report on the workshop entitled "NASA-LaRC Flight-Critical Digital Sys-
tems Technology Workshop" [1] is available.
Table 1: AssessmentTeamCoverageof Working Groups
AeronauticalRequirements
SpaceRequirements
SystemDesignFor Validation
Failure Modes
SystemModeling
ReliableSoftware
Flight Test
John E. Reed
Janet R. Dunham
Anthony S. Wojcik
GregChisolm
PeterJ. Saraceni
Daniel P. Siewiorek
Eliezer Gai
Janet R. Dunham
Cary R. Spitzer
was obtained and an assessment matrix of "Industry Needs vs. Research
Programs" was derived.
1.3 Organization of this Report
The report is organized into four sections: an Introduction and Overview sec-
tion on the Assessment Team and its review process; discussion on industry
trends as perceived by the speakers on the first day of the Flight-Critical Dig-
ital Systems Technology Workshop, and a summary of each working group
meeting of the workshop; a correlation of the Langley Research Center pro-
grams to the perceived industry needs; and finally, Recommendations.
The five appendices include the Assessment Team briefing agenda, the
Workshop agenda, the Assessment Team members, comments on some of
the activities under the NASA LangleyFlight-Critical ResearchProgramby
a few AssessmentTeam members,and AssessmentTeam report summary
viewgraphs.
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2 Workshop Observations: Industry Needs
2.1 Industry Trends
Several trends were perceived from the guest speakers during the first day of
the Workshop. The first is that the complexity of individual systems, such
as flight control, were increasing. Second, more of the functions are being
performed digitally as opposed to the more historic analog and mechanical
technologies. Third, for economic reasons, more systems such as propulsion,
air data, avionics, etc., were being integrated with flight control. This inte-
gration causes the "core" of flight-critical systems that require verification
to increase by over an order of magnitude. Even though the individual sub-
systems may not be flight-critical, the fact that they are integrated with
flight-critical subsystems requires verification that they will not interact in
a harmful manner. Fourth, avionics is an ever-increasing item in terms of
time and manufacturing costs of aircraft, approaching 50% of the cost in
contemporary military aircraft.
Several issues were also perceived in system design. As system increases,
the design effort increases in a nonlinear fashion due to the growing size of
design teams. In particular, the communications overhead increases as the
square of the number of people who need to communicate. Furthermore,
if these communications are carried on in an individual fashion there is in-
creased probability of inconsistency. These design teams are composed of
multiple disciplines where each discipline contributes to the design concur-
rently rather than in a sequential fashion. There is early emphasis on depend-
ability (e.g., reliability, availability, maintainability, safety) with computer-
aided design tools for support. The concept of system-wide integrity man-
agement is emerging. Traditionally, problems have surfaced at the interface
between disciplines where the communications is incomplete or ambiguous.
The crossing of the subsystem boundaries means that assumptions need to
be tracked to ensure consistency among the subsystems as well as identi-
fying those subsystems effected by a modification or an update in another
subsystem.
The technology to integrate and verify systems depends on the "ground
rules" of the local situation. For example, a completely new system may have
the freedom to develop a new approach, whereas an upgrade to an existing
system probably requires an increment on the verification process originally
usedfor the system.How can theseincrementalchangesbe verified?Often,
details of the original integration and verification processhave been lost.
How can this information be preservedand used in future updates of the
systemaswell asbeing transferredto newsystemsdesign?
There is alsoan increasinggapbetweenthe theoretical capabilitiesof the
concept,aspredictedby modelingor simulation, and that actually demon-
strated in the field. Howcan this gap bediminishedin general;in particular,
how can the performanceof new conceptsbe predictedwithout costly field
evaluation?
At the sametime assystemcomplexity increases,the threats or "failure
modes"to systemsis increasing.Threats include intra/inter-system electro-
magnetic interference(e.g., thereare a wider variety of sourcesfor interfer-
enceboth internal and external to the aircraft), lightning, static discharges,
high altitude electro-magneticpulses,sabotage,and designerrors. These
increasingthreats pose a significant challengeto both system designand
verification.
The guestspeakersofferedmany suggestionsthat could assistin the re-
sponseto the abovechallenges.
• A methodologyto developand verify "requirements".
• A metric for predicting and evaluatingcomplexity.
• A list of "safe" designfeaturesand their importance (e.g.,Byzantine
resilience,designdiversity, etc.).
• Validation for nondeterministicsystems,suchas artificial intelligence/
knowledge-basedesigns.
• Validation of the support tools, such as computer-aideddesignand
computer-aidedmanufacturing.
• Evaluationof new technologiesand their impact on avionicssystems,
suchascompositematerials for air frames.
• Identifyingother newtechnologies(e.g.,fiberoptics) to withstandlight-
ning threatsand Ada.
Assessment Team Working Group Reports
Summary of the Requirements for Flight-Critical Digital
Systems -- Aeronautical Working Group
John Reed
Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center
To put this assessment in the proper perspective, one must review the
"sessions" definition of flight-critical digital system as provided 2. Out of
that discussion came the eight general discussion topics. From that came a
listing of 21 research/needs and a set of six research requirements. After an
extensive time of deliberations, a comprehensive set of ten recommendations
for NASA/industry aeronautics research initiatives were developed. An as-
sessment of the priorities and near term research initiatives is provided in
this report.
First, if one is looking to implement competitive advanced flight control
systems technology by the year 2000, the effort primarily is "near-term and
high priority[" But, the research needs and recommendations defined by the
aeronautical requirements working group will be taken as a point of departure
for my assessment and priorities that are given in Appendix D.
The high priority needs are:
1. To acquire Electro-Magnetic Environment (EME), i.e., lightning, High
Energy Radio Frequency (HERF), aircraft electrical hazards, static dis-
charge, etc., data, threat definition analyses, modeling, upset studies,
protection concept design, test and evaluation, etc.
2. Compilation and analysis of in-service experience, reliability, failure
data, etc., for flight-critical systems, equipment, and components (i.e.,
down to solid state device level) must be acquired, understood, and
sanitized.
3. Early on, as a part of the FAA Certification Process, the new technol-
ogy certification basis must be developed for the FAA and industry air-
2See pages 13-14 of "NASA-LaRC Flight-Critical Digital Systems Technology Work-
shop"
9
craft/systems design, testing, and certification. Regulations, advisory
material, guidelines, etc., must not inhibit technology implementation.
4. Cost and performance trade-offs must be accomplished for complex
fault-tolerant systems (in light of the FAA's understanding and the
certification process).
5. Cost and time effective verification and validation philosophies must
be developed for "complex integrated systems."
6. Advanced analyses tools, i.e., modeling, fault insertion/tolerance, fault
detection coverage, etc.
7. Structured requirements methodology tools need further development.
8. Structured design methodology tools need further development, i.e.,
automatic code generation, logic synthesis, etc.
9. System(s) stress testing (i.e., random failures, upset, inputs, noise, en-
vironment, etc.) must be pursued.
10. Advanced maintenance concepts over life cycle of aircraft, i.e., EME
protection, safety, systems requirements.
Issues and concerns related to these needs are:
• Current FAA rules, regulations, Advisory Circulars, etc., inhibit ad-
vanced digital flight control and avionic systems innovation design, de-
velopment, and implementation.
• FAA rules and regulations, if interpreted by Special Conditions, should
be coordinated and developed with airlines, airframe, and systems de-
signers prior to initiating a modification or new development, and not
after the fact during the type certification process (get user, manufac-
turer, and FAA together right up front).
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2.2.2 Summary of the Requirements for Flight-Critical Digital
Systems -- Space Working Group
Janet R. Dunham
Research Triangle Institute
The space requirements working group addressed issues of changing re-
quirements in space applications (e.g., the aerospace plane, the shuttle, the
launch vehicles, earth orbiting satellites, the space station, and planetary
craft). Discussion focused on the joint Air Force/NASA Advanced Launch
System as an example of current requirements.
In the past, high reliability was achieved by using extensively tested single
string systems with redundancy being employed for crucial single point fail-
ures. This approach resulted primarily from restrictions on system weight
and power consumption. The working group established a consensus that
technology advances in hardware, software and fault-tolerant system archi-
tecture; the increase in lift capability; and more demanding application re-
quirements dictate the need to reassess space vehicle requirements for fault-
tolerant avionics.
Critical issues addressed during the working group included what were
appropriate figures-of-merit for avionics use in space applications, systems
costs and testing, system engineering and integration, and requirements for
future systems.
Key working group recommendations included addressing what the ap-
propriate figure of merit for system design is (e.g., cost, reliability, time
coverage, and availability), defining an approach to specifying parts levels
(i.e., Class S vs Class B), and an increased emphasis on integration research
activities such as integration of a health monitoring interface and validation
of adaptive GN&C/intelligent systems.
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2.2.3 Summary of the System Design for Validation Working Group
Anthony S. Wojcik,
Michigan State University/Argonne National Laboratory
with the assistance of
Greg Chisholm, Argonne National Laboratory
and
Peter J. Saraceni, Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center
The stated focus of this Working Group was the question of how can flight-
critical digital system technology be made part of initial vehicle design and
thus escape the traditional "add on" role of electronic systems? The group
initially reviewed the issues of verification and validation and addressed the
scope of the design for validation problem.
Validation was defined to be the process by which it is determined that
the specifications of the system as a whole are correct and meet the overall
system requirements. Verification was defined to be the process whereby it
is determined that the hardware and software implementation of the system
meets the specifications.
It was noted that the complexity of individual avionics systems was in-
creasing and that there was a trend toward the integration of various digital-
based systems. The result is that the "core" of what will have to be verified
will expand by an order of magnitude. The consensus view was that verifica-
tion was hard enough and that validation is even more difficult. Further, it is
impossible to get control of the overall complexity of a flight-critical system
with current techniques and tools for design and analysis. It became appar-
ent that what was needed was an overall methodology of system engineering.
The methodology needed to incorporate the principles of modularity, and it
was indicated that a mathematical basis for design and formal analysis was
greatly desired.
The Working Group spent a considerable amount of time discussing the
features of a design methodology and the development of an integrated tool
set for system engineering. Fundamentally, the methodology is to be based on
a "common language" that could be used from "requirements specification"
to "rollout'. Hence, a hierarchical design methodology is needed.
There was a desire to have a "language" that would support a common
database. The database would be accessible via the "language" to all the
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actual "tools" that wouldbedeveloped.It wasnotedthat the acceptedview
of the "language"wasthat it shouldserveasa meansto helpthe designerto
keeptrack of information (a bookkeeper)and that the "language"wasnot
yet to beviewedasa "designassistant."
The Working Groupgenerateda long list of featuresthat weredesirable
of the methodology.Discussionindicatedthat manyof thesefeatureswould
require further researchfor appropriate "tools" to be developedand inte-
grated into the methodology.The following list containsmost of the major
"tools" that weredesired.It shouldbenotedthat the Groupwanted"tools"
that would be capableof analyzingeachof the conceptscontainedin this
list with the expectation that the "tool" would either provide information
about the usefulnessof the conceptfor a specificphaseof the overall design
or provideusefulanalysisof the conceptfor a specificdesignphase.
1. Applicability of n-versionsoftwareand hardware.
2. Tradeoffs between performance and fault tolerance.
3. Partitioning of functions between hardware and software.
4. Applicability of concurrent (parallel) processing for performance en-
ha.ncement.
5. Complexity metrics and approaches to complexity reduction.
6. Impact of the operational environment.
7. Testability.
8. Performance evaluation and simulation.
9. Verification techniques.
From this list, one can see that there was a strongly expressed desire to have
an integrated approach to the design process.
It was evident from the discu.hsion that there was hesitancy on the part
of some to move toward the development of such a methodology. Funda-
mentally, the hesitancy was based on the unwillingness to invest in such a
procedure and to commit to use a standard system that would be shared by
all the constituents of the industry. Further, there was the question of how to
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compelthe industry to makeuseof sucha commonmethodology.The point
wasmade that international competitorseither haveor will be developing
sucha methodology. If the aerospaceindustry doesnot facethe challenge
now, it facesthe sameproblemsthat the automobileand semiconductorin-
dustrieshavefaced.
Alsoapparentwasthe fact that there is a recognitionthat digital- based
systemswere needed,but that there wasalsoconcernabout suchsystems.
Someeven suggestedthe needfor mechanicalback-ups. The importance
of the integrated designof hardwareand softwarewas recognized,but not
fully appreciated.The lessonsof the computer industry in which hardware
wasin somecasesdevelopedvirtually independentof softwareconsiderations
havenot beenlearned.It couldalsobe seenthat while "parallel computing"
wasa conceptthat could help, there wasbroad disagreementabout what
"parallelism" meant.
It becameclear that the role for NASA was to take the initiative in
the developmentof the methodologyfor systemengineering. NASA could
work on the "language"and "database"issuesand work with the industry
to acceptthem. NASA could showhow the "database"can be developed,
how it can be used,and how "tools" can be designedto interact with the
"language"and "database". It would be essentialto obtain a commitment
from industry to usethe NASA developmentsaswell asa commitmentfrom
NASA for the long-rangesupport of theseitems.
2.2.4 Summary of the Failure Modes Working Group
Daniel P. Siewiorek
Carnegie-Mellon University
The charter of the Failure Modes working group was to determine how
the various failure modes impact the design of flight-critical digital systems.
Three recommendations were presented to the Workshop as a whole that
were deemed to have high priority.
o EME/HERF research. Design verification criteria should be developed
for these threats. The analysis capability should include models of the
transfer process of coupling of the energy from the external environ-
ment to the internal units including boxes and connectors. The system
and vehicle responses should be predicted as a prelude to verification
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testing. Accelerated life testing on new technologies such as fiber optics
designed to combat these threats should also be conducted.
2. Testing. Research is required to improve troubleshooting and diagnos-
tic aids so that troubleshooting and line-replaceable unit turn-around
times are diminished. Quantification and verification of the effective-
ness of various techniques should be studied including error detec-
tion/correction approaches. Guidelines should also be developed for
injecting faults which assess the performance and capabilities of these
detection and correction techniques.
3. Component trends. An on-going test program which provides empirical
data on new families of digital devices should be developed. The data
should include: energy thresholds for upset, failure modes, and annual
updates to Mil Handbook 217.
Two long-term goals were identified:
1. Effectiveness and optimization of redundancy techniques including cost
versus risk analysis criteria. The best methods for tolerating threats
should be catalogued along with their effectiveness and guidelines for
incorporating them into the design process.
2. Data collection from 1975 to the present of single point failures and
domino events leading to vehicle loss.
This Assessment Team observer noted that the working group focused on
the EME/HERF threats. This observer believes the above recommendations
should be expanded to include other threats such as static discharges, high
altitude electro-magnetic pulses, sabotage, and design errors. Sabotage in
forms such as computer viruses should not be ignored. Future aircraft will
be composed of a network of computers which will be periodically connected
to other computer facilities such as maintenance. These other facilities will
in turn be connected to yet other networks and eventually some computer
node will be connected to a regional or national network. We should not
underestimate the ability of innocent or purposeful propagation of software-
altering programs.
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2.2.5 Summary of the System Modeling Working Group
Eliezer Gai
The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.
I attended the system modeling working group that was chaired by Phil
Babcock and had about 12 participants. I did not take part in the discussions
(except for a short while in the beginning) and this summary reflects my
own impressions of the discussions blended with impressions from individual
talks that I had with several members of the group (including all the Draper
participants), and influenced strongly by my own unbiased opinions.
The discussions, centered (too heavily) on the tools that are currently
available for reliability evaluation. Even though there was some disagree-
ment as to which tools (or underlying theories) are the best, it was clear that
industry needs are mainly in understanding of how to use the available tools
efficiently and how to gain confidence in the results that are obtained using
those tools. The implication was that the theoretical basis for reliability eval-
uation is well-founded (NASA Langley efforts have contributed enormously
to that cause) and the focus in the future should be on improving users in-
terface. I feel that the efforts to improve the interface should not be done by
NASA since they do not constitute new research, but rather be developed on
a commercial basis.
The open research areas are in expanding the tools' capabilities to include
performance, performability, and life cycle effects. The Advanced Launch
System (ALS) is a case in point. The requirements are not for reliability
only, but also for the probability of payload insertion within a given error
footprint in position and velocity. In addition, the tight requirements for
cost per pound require a cost analysis that will include the effects of losing
the payload as well as missing the footprint. Some work has been done in
this area, particularly for space vehicles. More research can be done in this
direction for aircraft flight-critical systems where performance requirements
are not uniquely defined. It seems to me that this is a good area for NASA
to perform follow-on research.
I feel that there is some confusion within industry with regard to the
notion of what tools can do. Tools will never replace capability, and the real
issue for the industry is either to develop a capability inhouse to deal with
system modeling, or to contract somebody to do it for them. The capability
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issue is the same as in design of control systems and the fact that there
are now good control design tools did not change the issue. In contrast to
what I heard in the discussions, industry needs people with systems analysis
background rather than people with knowledge of stochastic processes in
order to develop this capability. Using the control analogy again, to design
a control system you need knowledge of dynamic systems theory and not
knowledge of measure theory. In addition, similar to the argument that it is
not important whether you use classical or modern control theory as long as
you do it right, it does not matter whether you use Markov or combinatorial
analysis in system modeling.
How one goes about building this capability is another important issue.
It is hard to draw people to the field for two reasons. Reliability modeling
does not have a good image, and there are very few schools that have classes
available on this subject. I think that NASA can contribute in this area by
organizing workshops that will include a short course on the subject, work on
a common problem, and have discussions on specific problems that industry
has with their programs.
2.2.6 Summary of the Reliable Software Working Group
Janet R. Dunham
Research Triangle Institute
Concern over the problems associated with developing and validating the
reliability and safety of software used in flight-critical systems has increased
since the 1981 NASA Langley sponsored meeting that addressed these issues.
The reliable software working group re-addressed many of these issues and
added a few new ones (e.g., validation of software development tools and
expert systems, and the role of Ada) with discussion focusing on how software
should be treated as a component of flight-critical systems.
The reliable software working group discussion was broad and an empha-
sis was placed on involving all the working group participants. It yielded a
consensus on the major software issues as well as a comprehensive, detailed,
and prioritized list of research activities.
The following unprioritized list reflects my independent assessment of the
major points made.
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• TechnologyDevelopmentin support of additional standardsandguide-
linesfor developmentof real-time avionicssoftwareis needed.
• Cost/benefit analysisof Fault-TolerantSoftwareStrategiesfocusedon:
1. comparisonfor fixed cost with other verification, validation, and
test strategies
2. developmentand evaluationof variousvoting strategies
3. data collectionand analysisfor real-worldsystems;in particular,
degreeof independence,configurationmanagement,and cost is-
sues
• Developmentand evaluationof singleversionsoftware.Specificissues
include:
1. evaluationof effectivenessand determinationof waysto improve
varioustest strategies(e.g.,automatedand semi-automatedgen-
eration of test cases,test effort planning,newstrategies)
2. effectivenessof softwaresafetytechniques(e.g.,softwarefault tree
analysis,softwarefailure modesand effectanalysis,and software
hazardanalysis)
3. contribution of proof of correctnesstechniquesfor establishing
softwareintegrity
4. data collectionand analysisof real-worldsystems
5. effectof Ada on achievingreliableflight-critical systems
• Definitionof Requirementsfor Verification,ValidationandTest(V,V&T)
of SoftwareDevelopmentTools
• Developmentof toolsfor maintaining,enhancing,andretargetingflight-
critical software
, Developmentof Tools and Criteria for V,V&T of AI systems(e.g.,
expert fuel handling,emergencymanagement)
• SoftwareModelingand Measurement
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1. evaluationand refinementof product and processmeasuresvs.
achievedreliability and safety
2. addressdifficulty in quantitatively measuringand modelingsoft-
warereliability whenultra-reliability requirementsarebeinglevied
(e.g.,complementaryvalidation of models,breakthroughsin sta-
tistical theory that arenecessary)
• SystemsIssues
1. evaluatepartitioning strategies(e.g., techniquesfor establishing
softwareerror containmentregionsand criticality partitioning)
2. Softwareimplementedfault tolerancefor diagnostics/maintenance
3. measurementand descriptivecharacterization of hardware and
softwareerrorsfor on-line detectionand diagnosis
Thesekeypoints werereflectedin the constructionof the reliablesoftware
portion of the matrix providedin Section4.
Basedon my involvementin softwareresearchand developmentprojects
sponsoredby both governmentandindustry, I recommendthat NASA Lan-
gley beginto incorporatesoftwareresearchresultsinto a tailorable software
reliability evaluationenvironment.This environmentcould contain:
1. verificationandvalidation (v&v) tools (e.g.,test, safetyanalysis,CASE
relatedanalysis,and formal verification tools)
2. softwaremetricsandreliability growth modelswith calibration/refinement
from operationalusage
3. softwarereliability engineer'sassistantfunctions. For example,
(a) knowledgebaseof error data for feedbackto developers(e.g.,
causalanalysisfor future defectprevention)
(b) a knowledgebaseof modeling and analysis procedures
Components of this environment could then be used by indus.try and in future
research projects. As more effective tools and techniques are developed and
more research data is acquired they could be integrated into this environment.
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2.2.7 Summary of the Flight Test Working Group
Cary R. Spitzer
NASA Langley Research Center
Flight testing of digital systems is where the electrons meet the tarmac.
The recommendation of the Flight Test Working Group is "NASA flight-
critical systems research program should develop and demonstrate this pro-
cess ('systematic design, test, evaluation and validation') including flight
test."
Flight testing is mandatory to demonstrate that systems developed using
current assessment and validation models and tools will work. It validates
these models and tools and, to a lesser extent, the system. (Because of the
large number of possible states in a digital flight control system, complete
validation of a system in any reasonable flight test program is impossible.)
The Flight Test Working Group feels that flight testing is an integral
part of an iterative, closed-loop process whereby experience gained in build-
ing, laboratory evaluation, and flight testing of a real, flight-critical system
is fed back into modifications and enhancements of the system and, more im-
portantly from the workshop viewpoint, into the refinement of the assessment
and validation tools.
Focusing on real flight hardware brings out system integrity and system
functionality issues. Typical system integrity issues include hardware/software
compatibility; fault detection, isolation and recovery; timing; and hardware
interfaces with sensors, actuators, and other aircraft systems. Typical sys-
tem functionality issues include pilot/vehicle interface; envelope limiting; and
automatic flight control, e.g., flutter suppression, autonomous landing and
autonomous windshear guidance.
The Flight Test Working Group recommends the construction and flight
testing of a vehicle management system that embodies the important system
integrity and functionality issues. The system should include:
• Fly-by-wire or fly-by-light flight controls
• Crew station displays
• Autonomous landing
• Windshear prediction
• Flutter suppression
2O
3 Industry Needs vs. Research Programs
The Assessment Team compared the industry needs defined during the Flight-
Critical Digital Systems Workshop to the NASA Langley flight-critical sys-
tems research program. This comparison was conducted immediately after
the workshop during a single afternoon meeting. The objectives of this com-
parison were:
• to obtain a consensus on the industry needs gleaned during the work-
shop, and
• to assess the coverage of the industry needs by the NASA Langley
in-house flight-critical systems research program.
Both these objectives were accomplished by the Assessment Team, the
results of which are summarized below.
3.1 Consensus Viewpoint on Industry Needs
Each Assessment Team member provided their viewpoint on the industry
needs identified during the workshop. These viewpoints were then combined
into a single list and categorized by a general research topic that would ad-
dress these needs. The general topics identified were validation, assessment,
design, EM upset, data collection, and maintenance. Table 2 defines this list.
Once the combined list of needs was created, each team member present
cast four votes reflecting what they considered as the highest priority needs.
The results of this voting are shown in Table 3 . Industry needs with equal
number of votes were assigned the same priority. Industry needs receiving
zero votes have been omitted from this Table. Members of the Assessment
Team (who were present during the vote) unanimously agreed that a vali-
dated hierarchical integrated tool set was the most important industry need.
3.2 Current Research Program Coverage of Industry
Needs
After reaching this consensus, the Assessment Team proceeded by mapping
the industry needs to the NASA Langley in-house research program. This
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mapping is shownin the matrix given in Table 4 . The rowsof this ma-
trix correspondto on-goingin-houseNASA Langley flight-critical research
programsthat werereviewedby the AssessmentTeam. The columnscorre-
spondto industry needsorganizedby the generalresearchtopics previously
establishedin Table 2 . The matrix cellsdepict the numberscorresponding
to the industry needslisted in Table2 . Someof thesetaskshavethe letter
F or P or a ? associatedwith them wheretheseletters describethe current
coverageof the researchactivities:
P Full coverage; i.e., Aware of all approaches proposed during workshop
P Partial coverage; i.e., Only working on part of the problems identified by
the workshop
? Insufficient information for determining coverage
The matrix cells below the solid double line contain recommended areas
for new research tasks. The matrix applies to methodologies for V & V
through the total life cycle, including the cost- and time-effectiveness of the
methodology for complex integrated systems.
This mapping activity resulted in the following observations with respect
to the coverage of the current research program:
• all tasks under the current research program are at least partially ad-
dressing the industry needs listed in Table 2 .
except for Industry Need 5.1, In-service Experience, the research pro-
gram is addressing (with varying degrees of coverage) the higher priority
industry needs identified in Table 3.
• due to funding limitations there are a significant number of industry
needs either not being covered or not being covered adequately.
• the current program is front-end loaded in terms of the life cycle.
From these observations, the Assessment Team concluded that the re-
search program was on track in meeting industry needs and could benefit
from additional dollars to provide more coverage of these needs.
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4 Recommendations
4.1 General
Within the scope of the activities conducted, the Assessment Team has found
the research program to be very sound. All tasks under the current research
program are at least partially addressing the higher priority industry needs.
However, the workshop generated many more critical research needs than
the Information Systems Division has resources. The team recommends that
the program resources be substantially expanded to give adequate coverage
to the existing research and extended to additional areas identified in Table
2.
4.2 Specific
1. The current program is front-end loaded in terms of the life cycle and
needs to be extended into downstream activities to include operations
and maintenance.
2. We recommend initiation of research tasks in the following areas:
(a) the development of a validated hierarchical integrated tool set that
can be used to address issues related to life-cycle validation
(b) the conduct of cost-tradeoff and effectiveness studies of design
methodologies and fault tolerance concepts
(c) the development and verification of easy-to-use modeling tools
that address reliability, performance, coverage, and cost
(d) the conduct of threat modeling, and propagation analysis and test-
ing. In particular, develop design verification criteria for Electro-
magnetic Environment(EME)and High Energy Radio Frequency
(HERF) related threats.
(e) the compilation and analysis of in-service data
3. In order to focus the research program, we recommend the selection of
an actual hardware and software system that is under development as
a vehicle for an ongoing evaluation of the emerging technology.
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4. We recommend that personnel attend more applications-oriented con-
ferences (e.g., AIAA, IEEE, SAE) in addition to research conferences.
g. We know there are other advisory committees and a peer review pro-
cess; however, we suggest that a standing industry/academic oversight
committee be established. The committee should meet annually to
review the internal/external research sponsored by the branch. The
purpose of this committee is to help focus the research and effect tech-
nology transfer. The long term nature of this committee would provide
continuity in tracking progress, thus yielding an historical perspective
of the benefits of the research program in lieu of a single snapshot.
6. To assist in technology transfer:
• We propose that the AIRLAB Interface be published on an annual
basis and expanded to include all supported research projects. The
circulation list should be expanded.
• We suggest that workshops combining the modeling tool builders
and users be held.
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ASSESSMENT TEAM BRIEFING AGENDA
December 6, 1988, Building 1220, Room 110
8:30 a.m. Welcome Creedon
8:45 a.m. Introduction Meissner
9:15 a.m. AIPS Pitts
9:45 a.m. IAPSA Palumbo
10:15 a.m. Fault-Tolerant Software Eckhardt
10:45 a.m. Software Reliability Finelli
11:15 a.m. Redundant VHSIC Hayes
11:45 a.m. Lunch
1:00 p.m. Mathematical Verification Butler
1:45 p.m. Reliability Modeling by Butler
Path Analysis
2:15 p.m. System Upset Belcastro
2:45 p.m. Reliability Modeling by Bavuso
Behavioral Decomposition
Fault Simulation, G-GLOSS
Assessment Team Meeting
3:30 p.m. Bavuso
4:00 p.m.
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APPENDIX B
WORKSHOP AGENDA

Flight-Critical Digital Systems Technology Workshop
Agenda
December 13, 1988
9:00 a.m. -- 12:00 noon: Opening Session (Overview Talks)
9:00
9:30
10:00
10:30
11:00
11:30
Dr. J.F. Creedon, NASA Langley Research Center
Dr. Thomas B. Cunningham, Honeywell Systems Research Center
Dr. Carl S. Droste, General Dynamics
Mr. Jim Treacy, Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. Larry J. Yount and Mr. Richard F. Hess
Honeywell Commercial Flight Systems
Mr. Richard S. Ullman, ITT Defense Technology Corporation
1:00 p.m. -- 5:00 p.m.: First Parallel Working Groups Session
• Requirements for Flight-Critical Digital Systems -- Aeronautical
• Requirements for Flight-Critical Digital Systems -- Space
• System Design for Validation
• Failure Modes
• System Modeling
• Reliable Software
• Flight Test
December 14, 1988
8:30 a.m. -- 12:00 noon: Second Parallel Working Group Session
1:00 p.m. -- 5:00 p.m.: Third Parallel Working Group Session
December 15, 1988
8:30 a.m. Chairmen's Reports
12:30 p.m. Workshop Adjourns
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APPENDIX D
COMMENTS ON
SELECTED ASPECTS OF
THE NASA LANGLEY FLIGHT-CRITICAL
RESEARCH PROGRAM COMMENTS ON
SELECTED ASPECTS OF
THE NASA LANGLEY FLIGHT-CRITICAL
RESEARCH PROGRAM
This appendix provides summaries of material that partially supported the
Assessment Team in making the recommendations contained in this report.
These summaries were prepared by four different team members and do not
implicitly reflect the consensus viewpoint of the entire team.

NASA LANGLEY FLIGHT-CRITICAL RESEARCH
PROGRAM
Evaluation of Industry Relevance at NASA Langley
Daniel P. Siewiorek
Carnegie-Mellon University
For over two decades NASA Langley has been a leader in high-dependability
airborne computer systems. During the 1970's, the pioneering work in the
Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT) and Fault Tolerant Multipro-
cessor (FTMP) architectures had far-reaching impact on the architectures of
aerospace computer systems.
Throughout that period and continuing, NASA Langley has made effec-
tive use of external panels from academia and industry to not only assess
but also to help formulate research programs. These panels are often consti-
tuted by the internationally recognized leaders in reliable and fault-tolerant
systems.
The typical flight-critical systems research program is composed of be-
tween one and four in-house or on-site personnel with an annual discretionary
budget of $100,000 to $500,000 for external purchases such as equipment and
university/industry contracts. Since typically three full-time personnel are
required to form critical mass in a research area, the current FCS staff seems
to be spread thinly among the various research programs. Resources are in-
sufficient to carry out the research agenda. This is the classical dilemma of
a research program manager - whether to support fewer projects which all
attain critical mass or to support a broader range program so that the var-
ious interrelated technologies are tracked. Whereas the "pinnacles of excel-
lence" approach provides deep penetration and substantial results in a narrow
area, the broad based approach might be more appropriate for a government
agency which is responsible for a wide area. The current NASA Langley ap-
proach with technically-active, in-house researchers covering a broad range
of topics with selected external contracts providing penetration and depth
appears to be the appropriate model for the FCS. The external contracts can
be expanded or reduced as a function of available funding without impacting
the stability of the in-house organization. At this point in time, especially
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with respectto the modelingtools, transferof technologyto industry is crit-
ical to reap the benefitsfrom the researchprogram. The current approachto
technologytransfer is not completelyeffective. Furthermore,a moreeffective
program will requireadditional resourcesfrom industry/government.
The NASA Langley work on software reliability and fault tolerance is
one of the few government-fundedprogramswhich is attempting to place
the art of reliable software on a firm scientific and application basis. The
conception, careful construction, execution, and data analysis of software
experiments is essential for understanding the fundamental creative process
of systems design. The cross-fertilization and reuse of experimental data
between the software reliability and fault-tolerant software programs is not
only imaginative but also provides several independent interpretations of the
experiments. The data from these experiments provides concrete evidence
to settle differences between basic design approaches which heretofore have
been justified on the basis of intuition. Similar experiments for evaluating
the effectiveness of other software verification and validation techniques such
as safety analysis and software testing should also be addressed.
Verification and validation is essential for complex computer systems
which control flight-critical functions. The Information Systems Division
is pursuing several approaches to verification and validation. The mathe-
matical modeling and supporting software packages (e.g., CARE III, HARP,
SURE) developed through the last two decades represent the most advanced,
cohesive program in this area. The program has been particularly effective
since each succeeding generation of models built on the experience of the
previous generation. The software packages and models developed by the
System Validation Method Branch have had a strong influence upon selected
academic and industrial projects although they have not been universally
adopted. As the limitations of modeling as a verification approach have be-
come apparent, other approaches such as fault injection/simulation, formal
proofs and hot bench are being explored. Other approaches such as iron
bird and flight test have yet to be used. In the realm of simulation, several
commercial packages have become available which may be sufficient to per-
form the requisite functions. For example, Gateway Design Automation has
a simulator, VERILOG, which supports descriptions all the way from the
gate level through the register transfer and behavioral levels on up to statis-
tical architectural simulation. A companion simulator, VERIFAULT, does
fault simulation and has already been deployed in parallel versions. These
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commercialtools shouldbe explored to seeif they can fulfill the FCS and
industrial missions.
The area of mathematical verification remainscontroversialas to its ef-
fectivenesson real problems. However, there is a group of researchersad-
vocating that the current limits of mathematical verification shouldbecome
constraints upon the fundamental design methodology. For example, in a
network rather than producea different protocol for eachof the hierarchical
levels it may be superior to define a single mechanismwhich, when recur-
sively applied, can produceprotocolsat all of the various levels. Not only
would this singlemechanismbe better understoodby the designerand per-
haps lead to someeconomiesin the designprocess,it would also represent
a single building block to mathematically verify. This, however, is a very
long term approachin that it requiresnot only a proof of concept but also
a fundamental change in how systems are designed. While this is a massive
undertaking, it should not detour effort from initiating a research program.
In order to focus attention, we recommend the selection of a real subsys-
tem that is under development as a vehicle for an ongoing evaluation of the
emerging technology.
The fault-tolerant Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) effort
suggests a mechanism for not only reaching critical mass but also for testing
concepts such as an entirely new design methodology. Whereas the fault-
tolerant VHSIC project is constrained to use industrially-supplied modules,
the available manpower and the research leadership is insufficient to build
a true fault-tolerant system. Yet there is expertise within the branch in
modeling, software reliability, replicated system failure modes and solutions,
and mathematical verification that could be brought to bear for a total sys-
tem solution. The branch may wish to consider the augmented approach to
research which periodically (with the period specified by the confluence of
a set of maturing technologies - but perhaps no more frequently than once
a decade) embark upon a system specification, design, construction, and
validation a. This would not only transfer technology between the internal
programs supported by the research, but it would also give those individual
research programs a concrete, detailed example. This example would serve
to illuminate holes in the current research results and help set future direc-
aThe complexity of the target system could range from a simple, couple of man-year
effort to a complex integrated system concept such as the ACEE-EET initiative.
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tions for individual researchprojects. Likewise,the project could bea good
demonstration vehiclefor transferring technologyto industry. It would be a
testbed for such radical designmethodologychangessuchas simplification
for mathematical verification. Someof the low level work suchas board lay-
out and manufacturing could becontracted out to one of many commercial
board fabrication services. The fault-tolerant VHSIC project in particular
could havebenefitedfrom suchan approach.
The issueof technologytransfer to industry is a difficult one. As the
Integrated Airframe PropulsionSystemArchitecture (IAPSA) programindi-
cated,NASA-sponsoredexternal researchisoften requiredto gainthe interest
of industry. Subsequently,the industrial teamgoesthrough someof the same
learning curvesthat NASA hasalreadybeenthrough. Sincetheseindustrial
teams are typically researcherswith no deadline responsibilities for gener-
ating aerospacesystems,the technologytransfer more closelyapproximates
osmosisthan a direct infusion of technology.However,industrial participa-
tion isessentialfor producingrealisticmissionrequirementsandfor providing
timely feedbackon the strengthsand weaknessesof tools and methodologies
in real designsituations.
Another major form of technologytransfer is reports. There is typically a
long lead time betweencompletion of the researchand the availability of the
reports. Furthermore,thesefinal reportsareoftenvoluminousand difficult to
readdueto their detail. While workshopshelptransfer information at a point
in time, they arestill only onetime eventswhichonly transfer information to
thosewho werein attendance.Perhapsvideotapesrepresentingoverviewsof
NASA projects and limited to 30minutesin duration wouldprovidea wayof
transferring technologythat transcendsthe workshops. Furthermore, these
video presentationscould be transcribed into documentsfor leisurereading
when VCR's are not available. The software tools that NASA producesis
also another opportunity for technologytransfer. Frequently thesetools are
stand-alonewith only rudimentary man-machineinterfaces.While the core
computationalenginesrepresentthe researchcontributions, the tools needto
be integrated into existing CAD environmentsusing input data from stan-
dard data basesandwith easyto useand graphics-orientedhumaninterfaces.
The codefor the computationalengineperhapsrepresentslessthan a third of
the codefor a successfulcommercialproduct. It would be interesting to see
if there could be a more formal mechanismfor coupling the public domain
computational enginesproduced by NASA into commercialCAD environ-
D-4
ments. It is only when the tools are availableto the systemsdesignerin a
form that is convenientto use that the true impact of the researchwill be
felt.
Personnelshouldattend both researchand applications-orientedconfer-
ences(e.g.,American Institute of Aeronauticsand Astronautics (AIAA), In-
stitute of Electricaland ElectronicsEngineers(IEEE), Societyof Automotive
Engineers(SAE)).
Data collected from actual ground-basedcommercial systemsindicates
that the sourcesof computer systemoutageare fairly evenlydivided between
hardware, software,maintenance,operator mistakes,and environment. The
NASA Langley research program has focused on architectures to tolerate
hard failures, design errors in hardware/software, and environment such as
lightning strikes and single event upsets. The workshop identified several new
areas of research including tolerance of other threats (i.e., HERF, sabotage,
etc.), down stream concerns such as fault-tolerant man-machine interfaces
for both operations and maintenance, etc. Research programs should be
developed in these areas accompanied by appropriate levels of additional
funding.
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Some Comments On NASA Langley's Development Projects
HermanSchmid
GE, Binghamton,NY
AIPS: Advanced Integrated Processing System
With the integration of flight-critical systems, such as the Vehicle Man-
agement System (VMS) for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), there is a
definite need for highly reliable multiprocessor systems.
The PAVE PILLAR and Advanced System Avionics (ASA) architecture
developments funded by the Avionics Lab at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base are based on a distributed multiprocessor system in which processors
are interconnected by a quad-redundant high speed (100 MHz) fiber optic
token-passing data bus. Employing such an advanced concept in the next
fighter aircraft causes great concern in flight control circles, since there are
still no methodologies to verify and validate such an advanced system.
I believe that AIPS can overcome some of the major problems in verifying
and validating multiprocessor configurations, since its key feature is the use
of verified building blocks.
However, what I have not seen yet is a methodology that verifies any
combination and configuration of verified building blocks, such as the Fault
Tolerant Processor (FTP) in all required operating modes.
Is source congruency essential for verifying the FTP operation? Imple-
menting this feature adds not only hardware and raises failure rates, but also
increases cross channel data transfer and thereby introduces the potential
for more transmission faults. The additional burden may be justified for a
system requiring a mission reliability of 10 -9, but not for systems with a
10 -_ requirement, especially when we have no idea what the magnitude of
the probability of Byzantine faults is.
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IAPSA: Integrated Airframe Propulsion System Architecture
While FTMP, SIFT, and AIPS consider only the digital processing por-
tion of future control systems, IAPSA is the first one that addresses the
Input/Output (I/O) functions, which in many applications are just as com-
plex, or even more so, than the processing functions and just as challenging.
To achieve this, IAPSA proposes to use a reconfigurable fault-tolerant net-
work to interconnect up to 20 I/O nodes.
The hardware needed to implement this network, even if built with cus-
tom ICs, significantly impacts overall system size, weight and cost. However,
even more disturbing is the complexity of the reconfiguration scheme, which
is equal to that of a set of distributed multiprocessors. Consequently, it
might be just as difficult to verify and validate such a network as it is for
a reconfigurable multiprocessor system. A Boeing analysis showed also that
the network offers little improvement in reliability over a quad-redundant
I/O bus. Finally, the network assumes smart sensors and actuators, which
still pose such key problems as: t) operation in harsh environment, 2) cost
of supplying redundant power to each node, and 3) maintenance access in
hard-to-get-at locations.
However, although the results on this reconfigurable I/O network study
are not very promising, the program is definitely attacking the right problem,
because unless progress is made in the I/O field, the overall size, weight, cost
and reliability of future control systems will be dictated by the I/O.
SURE: Semi-Markov Reliability Evaluation
Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) is a very simple,
elegant (slick) and cost effective system reliability estimation tool, especially
when considering that it was practically developed on a "shoe string." The
addition of Abstract Semi-Markov Specification Interface for the SURE Tool
(ASSIST) now offers the much needed input capability. With it, SURE might
even be called "user friendly."
But SURE also has it limitations, especially with respect to its ability to
handle large systems. Hence, additional efforts should be made to overcome
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this limitation. I would like to see,for example,a study to determine if it
would not be possibleto give it the capability to handle large systemsin a
hierarchicalmulti-level fashion.
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Airlines Need for Economic Analysis of Flight-Critical Systems
Cary R. Spitzer
NASA Langley ResearchCenter
The airlinesavionicscommunity is developingrequirements,suchashigher
reliability anda capability for periodic maintenance(vis-a-vis the current on-
condition maintenance),for avionicssystemson aircraft that will beentering
servicein the mid-to-late 1990s. The airlines believethat if these require-
mentsare properly implemented,they will lead to reducedoperating costs.
In responseto theserequirements,the airframers haveproposedseveral
distributed, highly-integrated, flight-critical avionicsarchitectures,knownas
the Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) concept. IMA will be similar to the
VehicleManagementSystemof the Air ForcePAVE PILLAR architecture.
The IMA architecturesproposedby the airframersarebasedon advanced
technologiessuch as fault-tolerant hardware and software, and extensive
replication to permit user-transparent,real-time reconfiguration. Thesear-
chitectures are new to the airlines, and their existing tools and traditional
qualitative evaluation techniquesare not adequateto evaluate the architec-
tures in terms of meetingthe airlines requirements.
In the early 1980s,NASA Langley funded a study by the Boeing Com-
mercial Airplane Co. to comprehensivelyexamine the economicimpact of
fault-tolerant systemswhenusedon commercialtransports. The final report
from the study, CR 166043"Cost and BenefitsOptimization Model for Fault-
Tolerant Aircraft Electronic Systems,"is the only known non-proprietary in-
formation on the architectureevaluation issuesthe airlines now face. NASA
funding constraintsprecludedfurther study so the modelsdevelopedin the
report haveneverbeenreducedto practice.
Consequently,today the airlines have a major need for an operational
and economicperformanceassessmentool for fault-tolerant, flight-critical
systems.The most logical starting point for developingthe tool is to resume
the earlierLangley-sponsoredwork. By building on this earlierwork, I believe
the tool could be developedwith very modest resourcesand, furthermore, it
could be availablerelatively quickly.
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Observations on NASA Langley/ISD Projects
John Reed
Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center
The NASA Langley advanced flight control systems basic/fundamental
research technology projects in the past, and those currently underway, have
been beyond reproach. Those efforts in the forefront of civil/military industry
needs are:
• software/hardware reliability assessment
• software/hardware fault-tolerant computer concept development
• verification and validation tools, techniques, and methodologies
• solid state device physics and upset studies
• lightning characterization and modeling
• emulation/simulation in systems design, verification and validation,
and testing
• AIRLAB
It is obvious to the technologists and users that the U. S. has lost ground
in the commercial aircraft business, and possibly is on the edge of loss of
preeminence in military aircraft design and operations. With the advent
of Airbus Industrie A-320/330/340 series of aircraft/systems technology, the
U.S. aviation industry is losing the competitive edge in the market place. The
far-sighted Airbus consortium technology advancement application, state(s)
funding, and unique and innovative financing arrangements, plus the Amer-
ican dollar exchange rate, have pushed the airlines into considering options
other than purchasing Boeing, Douglas, etc.
Why then has not the US aviation industry made the same innovative leap
into the world of users/purchasers who want high technology aircraft? Is it
the liability problems or technical risks associated with advanced software-
based digital Fly-by-wire/Fly-by-light flight control systems...or the concern
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that the FAA would never certify such an aircraft? Costs of developing, test-
ing, and certifying aircraft/systems possibly all contribute to some degree,
but they are extremely difficult to quantify.
So, where do we go from here? The Flight-Critical Digital Systems Work-
shop is a good (hopefully) starting place. The industry may not criticize
NASA for its current programs, but possibly won't really constructively crit-
icize due to the "giving away its proprietary hand and/or birth rights," or
competitive edge. The results of the workshop should indicate the necessity
or priorities which may reorder or reconsider current NASA initiatives.
ACEE-EET, IAPSA, etc., go a long way in industry participation in proof
of concept or technology application. With the transition from aluminum
to composite airframes, analog to digital, separate subsystem/system de-
sign and implementation to the truly complex integrated (i.e., pilot/crew,
flight control, structure, and propulsion, etc.) flight systems, it is necessary
to consider a government/industry cost sharing effort to accelerate the US
resurgence in the aircraft/systems market.
It appears that a super-effort, such as the SST, with appropriate Congres-
sional mandates and funding could go a long way to rectify the delinquency
of having the next generation transport aircraft operational in early year
2000. Military technology transfer, NSF and DARPA fundamental research,
NASA and industry basic and applied technology development, innovative
certification processes, and an all out US supported activity could make it
possible for recovery by the year 2000.
Yes, there are major technical challenges (not stumbling blocks) to the
integrated Fly-by-wire/Fly-by-light (FBW/FBL) aircraft. "Flight- Critical"
alludes to full-time on-line with no failures for continued safe flight and land-
ing. One must produce a good requirements definition and system archi-
tecture to perform its intended function. There are many detailed subsets
of hardware/software reliability, unique design strategies and methodolo-
gies, upset/fault tolerance, functions, verification/validation, flight opera-
tions and maintenance that must be added. Analytical models and tools,
emulation/simulation techniques, experimental testing, lightning, and EME
protection will be a major effort in the reduction of technical risks. Threat
models, transfer function knowledge, susceptibility model and test concepts,
innovative immune technology development, etc., must be priority efforts.
After the above, one can say, "NASA is doing that required research."
With only 4-5% - NASA funding for aeronautical research, and Information
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Systems Division (ISD) less than $6M budget, it will be most difficult to
mount a major initiative from FY-89, up through the year 2000. Therefore,
NASA should view the Workshop output constructively, review its current
program efforts, and within its current budget constraints, prioritize/modify
its program direction.
May I now impart some of "J. Reed's thoughts and observations:"
Requirements are:
• Primary "Flight Critical" Digital Flight Control System shall:
- perform its intended function.
- be available for the required continued safe flight and landing.
- in a situation of fault, failure, upset, hiccup, etc., continue to
operate its intended functions with no perceptible indications of
fault, failure, upset, etc., to the pilot/crew.
• The flight control system and its associated sensors, computers, actua-
tors, displays, power/signal cabling, etc., shall be protected and tested
in accordance with the following4:
- be protected and tested in accordance with the FAA rules and
regulations, and Advisory Circular AC-20-XX-... "...Lightning
Protection of Electrical/Electronic Systems..." and Users Man-
ual DOT-FAA-CT-XX/XX Report (same title).
- be protected and tested in accordance with the FAA rules and
regulations, and Advisory Circular AC-20-XX- "Aircraft Radi-
ated Environment (High Energy RF Fields)", and Users Manual
DOT/FAA/CT-XX/XX Report (same title).
- be protected and tested in accordance with RTCA DO-160C Sec-
tion 20.0 (HERF), and Section 22.0 (Lightning).
Research needs are: (Complementary to Workshop Session Needs)
• Study, experiment, and test the "upset" phenomena as related to the
basic solid state devices:
4Some of these documents are not yet officially published.
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- Investigate with manufacturersthe characteristicsand reliability
of their devices.
- Considerthe fundamental,applied researchneedsin order to de-
sign and develop a microprocessordevice/module which will be
immune to the upsetphenomena.(This recommendationassumes
that the manufacturersdo not support this researchactivity.)
- Experiment and test the device,genericsubsystem/systemappli-
cations under lightning, EME, transient, etc., conditions.
- Apply this technologyin a genericflight control systems,design,
development,and test (ground/flight) program.
• Conduct a full-scalecommercialaircraft, i.e., B-747/767,MD-80, Star-
ship, etc., lightning and HERF test activity.
- Testto determinetransfer function onanaluminumand composite
aircraft.
- Measureinternal environment on-cabling, subsystem/systemsin
an aircraft non-operational/operationalcondition.
- In order to establishmarginsof safety:
• Test to levelwheresystems(s)areupset.
• Test to level wheresystem(s)may be damaged.
- Develop/enhancesusceptibility modelsand tools for designof pro-
tection concepts.
- Based on measurements,tests, modeling, etc., design, develop,
and test a genericprotected (lightning/EME) flight control sys-
tem.
• Explore/investigate a techniqueto acquire real-time HERF data from
civil/military flight operations.
• Conduct an investigation and analysisof current operational digital
flight control and avionic system experience,reliability, failure data,
etc.
• Continue to explore the useof simulation in the verification and vali-
dation (v&v) and certification process.
D-13
• Conduct investigationsinto the revalidation of flight-critical systems
after removal/replacementof Line ReplaceableUnits, i.e., systemsper-
formance,lightning/EME protection integrity, etc.
• Conduct investigations into on board systems and equipment health
monitoring and reporting concepts.
• DoD and/or NASA satellite measurements and identification of world-
wide HERF levels, i.e., NASA Lightning observations.
• Investigations and studies on similar vs dissimilar flight control systems
design concepts, i.e., design, functional, implementation, etc.
• Conduct comprehensive investigations of pilot/crew experience with
current flight operations using digital flight control and avionic systems.
- Based on these investigations:
• conduct a systems design study which uses the pilot/crew
integration inputs.
. with a generic flight control system, conduct comprehensive
cockpit simulator investigations to verify pilot/crew inputs.
Basically, advanced designs must consider a truly integrated set of re-
quirements from all disciplines and parties, not just flight control, propulsion,
aerodynamics, structural, etc.
D-14
APPENDIX E
ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT
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ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT
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